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The Spanish government declared the lockdown on March 14th, 2020 to tackle
the fast-spreading of COVID-19. As a consequence, the Balearic Islands remained
almost fully isolated due to the closing of airports and ports, these isolation measures
and the home-based confinement have led to a low prevalence of COVID-19 in this
region. We propose a compartmental model for the spread of COVID-19 including
five compartments (Susceptible, Exposed, Presymptomatic Infective, Diseased, and
Recovered), and the mobility between municipalities. The model parameters are
calibrated with the temporal series of confirmed cases provided by the Spanish
Ministry of Health. After calibration, the proposed model captures the trend of the
official confirmed cases before and after the lockdown. We show that the estimated
number of cases depends strongly on the initial dates of the local outbreak onset
and the number of imported cases before the lockdown. Our estimations indicate that
the population has not reached the level of herd immunization necessary to prevent
future outbreaks. While the low prevalence, in comparison to mainland Spain, has
prevented the saturation of the health system, this low prevalence translates into low
immunization rates, therefore facilitating the propagation of new outbreaks that could
lead to secondary waves of COVID-19 in the region. These findings warn about scenarios
regarding after-lockdown-policies and the risk of second outbreaks, emphasize the
need for widespread testing, and could potentially be extrapolated to other insular and
continental regions.
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INTRODUCTION
The rapid propagation of the new COVID-19 pandemic requires timely responses, including the
alignment of evidence generation by scientists and decision-making by policy stakeholders. As
of the current date, several mathematical models have been developed to help policy-making
in a wide arrange of interventions in various countries, encompassing from testing
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strategies to lockdown measures (1–6). Although modeling
pandemics is not without flaws, and its predicted scenarios
cannot be uncritically adopted and therefore directly translated
into policy (7), modeling can be a valuable support tool to guide
policy when assessed in an integrated way.
Recent studies have dealt with the possibility of a second-wave
of COVID-19 after the retirement of lockdown and confinement
measures in China (1, 2). Recently, the value of restrictive
social distancing measures has been largely proved since the first
outbreak of the pandemic in European countries such as Italy (8).
The analysis of data from closed confinements such as sea cruises
allows us to address some key questions regarding the risk of
second waves in an environment without external perturbations
(9, 10). The study of the evolution of the pathogen in islands
offers an opportunity to learn how the propagation occurs,
and how the mobility restrictions are shaping the propagation
in relatively isolated areas, either due to transport lockdowns
implemented to contain COVID-19 dissemination or because of
their geographical conditions.
The Balearic Islands archipelago is composed of four inhabited
islands in the Mediterranean Sea, i.e., Majorca, Menorca, Ibiza,
and Formentera, with a total population of 1,095,426, as per 2011
data (11). The main economic activity is tourism with principal
connections to the UK and Germany. The first reported case
in Spain was identified in the Canary Islands on January 31st,
while in the Balearic Islands the first case (second in Spain) was
confirmed on February 9th. He was a British citizen resident
in Majorca who had been in contact with an infected person
with SARS-CoV-2 during a stay in France from January 25–
29. In Spain, the schools were closed on March 16th and the
lockdown was implemented at the national scale from March
17th. As of April 11th, the number of infected cases in the Balearic
Islands was 140 per 100,000 inhabitants (1,507 confirmed cases)
to be compared with 345 in Spain (161,852 confirmed cases; data
updated with values of April 11th, 2020) (12). The lockdown
of the Balearic Islands includes the closing of airports and
ports for passengers, rendering the archipelago a virtually closed
system. In this regard, archipelagos are “living laboratories”
suggesting insights about the ecology and evolution of infectious
diseases and offering unique experimental testing protocols to
reduce or eliminate the diseases not only in the islands but
potentially across the world (13). Thus, the Balearic Islands
present an opportunity to be used as a benchmark to explore
how isolation and after-lockdown measures impact secondary
COVID-19 waves.
COVID-19 has a particular structure in the timings of the
disease that make it particularly dangerous in terms of a silent
spreading potential. First, the incubation period, i.e., the time
since infection to symptom onset, is relatively large around
5.2 days [95% confidence interval (CI), 4.1–7.0] (14). This
itself is a driver of the predictability of the spatiotemporal
patterns to expect from this disease (15). Furthermore, the
latent period, i.e., the time from infection to the start of
being infectious, does not align completely with the incubation
period (4). Although latency periods of median 3.69 days
(95% CI, 3.30–3.96) have been reported (16) infections can
occur days 1 and 2 after exposure (4, 17). This leaves a
period of presymptomatic infectivity, that increases R0 through
silent spreading, as not even the carrier might be aware of
its own infectivity (18). The relative effectiveness of different
non-pharmaceutical interventions will depend critically on the
relation of those times (incubation and latent period) (19).
Other related periods that shape the dynamics of the outbreaks
are the generation interval (time between infection of infector-
infectee pairs) (20) [example of mean values of generation
intervals are 5.20 days for Singapore data, and 3.95 days
for Tianjin, (21)] and the serial interval (the time between
symptom onsets of an infector-infectee pair), which has also
been used to estimate viral shedding dynamics for COVID-
19 (example of serial interval values are characterized by
a mean of 5.8 days [95% confidence interval (CI), 4.8–6.8
days] (4).
We aimed to study the dissemination of COVID-19 in an
isolated system through a compartmental model that included,
besides the susceptible (S), diseased (D) and recovered (R)
compartments, an exposed (E) compartment, and a pre-
symptomatic (I) infective compartment to account for the
incubation period, as the times of transit between the latter
two compartments are crucial for the modeling of COVID-19
(3, 4). Due to population size, we can implement an individual-
based model where we consider each inhabitant as an individual
in the model. In particular, first, we compare the results of
an individual-based model tailored for the Balearic Islands and
identify the parameter values that best fit the data. Second, we
explore the likelihood of a second-wave scenario as a function
of the initial date of the first imported case and the number of
imported cases before the lockdown.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Data
Population data for the 67 municipalities in the Balearic Islands
were taken from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE,
Spain), which gathers all the census data (11). The census
also provides the commuting flows for people that, according
to the registry, are living in one municipality and work in
another. This allows assigning a living location and working
location to each individual. For small municipalities, these
commuting fluxes are not included. We avoid the isolation of
thesemunicipalities (to be specific, Formentera with a population
of 12,111 inhabitants, Escorca 280, Estellencs 389, Banyalbufar
605, and Deyá 755) considering commuting flows of 10 people
toward each of the neighboring municipalities and Palma, the
capital of Balearic Islands.
Data for the active infected and cumulative infected cases
are obtained from the Ministry of Health (12). In particular,
the official reports provide data on the cumulative number of
infected, recovered, and deaths. The number of active infected
cases is taken as the cumulative number of infected cases and
subtracting deaths and recovered. Unfortunately, the values for
recovered cases are only reported fromMarch 22nd. Thus, for the
fitting, we considered all the historical series for the cumulative
number of cases while only values starting from March 22nd for
the number of active cases.
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Model
The relatively small population size of the Balearic Islands allows
us to develop an individual-based model. Each individual is
placed in one of 67 municipalities according to the census
(Supplementary Figure 1). The mobility between municipalities
is considered with commuting data from the 2011 census
provided by the INE (11). For each simulation day, we consider
two steps, one where each individual is located in its residence
municipality, and a second step where each individual is
placed in the working place. At each step, individuals can
interact with any of the individuals placed at the same location
(Figure 1). The number of individuals with residence in location
i and commuting with location j is denoted by Nij. Thus,
the population at location i is given by Ni= 6j Nij, and the
population at location i during working time is given byNi
′
= 6j
Nji. The location assignment is done sequentially starting from
N1,1, then N1,2, . . . until N67,67. This assignment is done initially
and such positions remain unchanged during the time evolution
of the model.
The states of the individuals correspond to a SEIDR model:
S, susceptible; E, exposed, corresponding to the latent period;
I, infectious, corresponding to the presymptomatic infective
period; D, diseased, corresponding to be infective with or
without symptoms; and R, recovered. The transitions between
these states are as follows, S becomes E in contact with an
infected individual (I or D) with probability β. After Tlat
(latent period) days, E becomes I; after Tinf (presymptomatic
infective period) days I becomes D, and after Tdis (disease),
D becomes R (Figure 1A).
The values of Tlat, Tinf, and Tdis were obtained from
the time evolution of the number of active infected and
cumulative infected cases in the Balearic Islands. The lockdown
was imposed in Spain on March 16th and the effect of the
mobility restrictions can be identified on March 22nd. The 6
days in this period are reflected in the incubation period, Tlat
+ Tinf (Supplementary Figures 2A,C), and agrees with recent
estimations (22). Finally, from the data on the cumulative
number of infected cases, the change in slope is observed on April
2nd, that is, Tdis = 12 days (Supplementary Figures 2B,C).
To implement the mobility restrictions, we observe from
the data that the cumulative number of infected cases shows a
bending every 7 days approximately, which is in accordance with
the beginning of the lockdown, and the restriction imposed on
March 15th, and later corrected on March 22nd and March 29th
(Supplementary Figure 2D). Thus, the model has the freedom to
adjust the infection probability every week after March 15th.
For a single day, the modeling proceeds as follows
(Figure 1),
1. First, it considers the population in their residence location,
for each municipality pairs of individuals in the same
municipality are selected, say i and j. Then, i updates his/her
state according to the dynamic rules. For each municipality p,
Np pairs are chosen randomly where Np is the population size
of the municipality p.
2. Second, we consider the individuals distributed in the
municipalities of work. For each municipality p’, we
chose Np’ pairs of random individuals working in the
same municipality p’.
3. Resume from 1.
Thus, on average, in a day, each individual is updated twice.
For calibration, the model is run exploring all the parameters:
Tlat + Tinf = 6 and Tdis = 12; and β is explored in the range [0,
1] in the following periods: β1 from the origin of the infection on
February 9th to March 15th, β2 fromMarch 16th to March 22nd,
β3 from March 23th to March 29th, β4 from March 30th to April
5th, β5 from April 7th to April 11th
The total number of infected cases depends on the date of
the first infection. Models assume that the beginning of the
outbreak is typically 30 days before the day when 10 infections
are recorded (23). In the case of the Balearic Islands, on March
8th, 11 confirmed cases were reported. The first case reported in
the Balearic Islands corresponds to an imported infection notified
on February 9th. Consequently, the beginning of the outbreak
was set on February 7th, 2 days before the first infected case
was identified. Thus, we explore the date of the beginning of the
infection between Jan 28th and Feb 7th.
Model Validation
The results of the model are validated with the official number
of active infected and the cumulative number of infected cases
between March 15th and April 11th. As the official values do not
take into account the non-tested asymptomatic and the diseased
not consulting to the healthcare systems, we assume that the
reported values are a proportion of the values obtained from the
model. Then, to validate the model parameters we minimize χ2,
χ2 = 6 (α Yi - yi)2, where α is a scale factor, that is, the ratio
between estimated and confirmed cases, Yi is the value obtained
from the model in day i, and yi is the official value in day i. Due
to the initial exponential growth of the epidemics, we calculate
χ2 for the logarithm of the cases: χ2 = 6 (log(α Y i) - log(yi))2.
The minimization of χ2 leads to an optimal scale factor log(α∗)
= 1/n6 (log(yi / Y i)), where n is the number of observation days.
For this value of α∗, we finally calculate the optimal values. Our
assumption implies that the scale factor should be similar to both
the active and cumulative infected cases.
For each set of parameters, we report the χ2 of the model
values of the number of active infected cases with respect to the
official values, the correction fraction αactive, and the χ2acc of the
model values of the number of cumulative infected cases with
respect to the official vales and the correction fraction αacc. For
each set of parameters, the best fit is considered as the one leading
to the minimum χ2. Once the fitting values are determined, we
calculate χ2acc and αacc. For each set of periods (Tlat, Tinf, Tdis),
we explore the infection probabilities that minimize χ2 of the
number of active infected cases. The value of χ2 and scale factors
α∗ of the best fits are shown in Supplementary Table 1 and the
estimated prevalence in Supplementary Table 2.
Quarantining Mechanism
In order to explore the effect of quarantines on the impact
of the second wave we implemented a stochastic quarantine
mechanism. When an individual reaches the symptom onset, i.e.,
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FIGURE 1 | Reactions in the model, interactions and movements. (A) Reactions in the epidemic model. (B) Map of the Balearic Islands showing all the municipalities
in the islands. (C–F) Zoom to the region in the red box in (B). (C,E) Show the interactions during the day and night, respectively. (D,F) Show the mobility to the night
location (home) and day location (work), respectively. Note that the mobility patterns are reversed from (D) to (E), i.e., the same agents always do the same commute.
when they reach the D state, with probability q the individual
is isolated from further interaction with other individuals. The
probability q can be understood as the fraction of cases that will
be quarantined or isolated.
Herd Immunity Assumptions
An approximation to the herd immunity threshold is given by 1–
1/R0 (24), which for COVID-19 is expected to be between 29 and
74%, taking R0 between 1.4 and 3.9 (14, 25). To explore whether
the number of cumulative infections reach the herd immunity
threshold and therefore avoidance of potential second waves is to
be expected, we run the model for the same parameters leading
to the best fit (24). After the system has relaxed to zero infection,
we select a random susceptible from the populations and infected
her. As we are interested in whether the epidemics will spread
again, we use the transmission rate obtained at the beginning
of the epidemics in the Balearic Islands, that is, before any
restriction onmobility had been applied.We can expect that once
the mobility restrictions have been removed, the transmission
will be reduced in comparison to the initial values, especially due
to an improvement in the hygiene of the population. This will
affect how fast the COVID-19 will spread and the intensity of the
wave. If the estimated number of infected cases is lower than the
threshold for herd immunization, we assume that SARS-CoV-2
will spread. In the Supplementary Materials, we show how the
data can be collapsed using a proper combination of the initial
number of infected cases and the time of the first infection.
RESULTS
Number of Active Infected Cases
The best fit of the model to the confirmed cases, allows us to
extract the transmission probabilities and also the scaling factor
that captures the ratio between the estimated and the confirmed
cases. For the scenario where the initial date was on Feb 7th, and
a latent period of 2 days (Tlat = 2), an infective period of 4 days
(Tinf = 4), and disease period of 12 days (Tdis = 12), the values of
the infection probability leading to the best fit are β1 = 0.24, β2 =
0.12, β3 = 0.016, and β4 = 0.036 (Figure 2). This translates into
an initial basic reproductive number R0 = 3.84. The fitting of the
data also informs us that the correction factor is 0.054, that is, that
the confirmed cases are 5.4% of the model estimates. At the same
time, we obtain that the percentage of added recovered cases and
fatalities according to the official sources the model estimate are
5.3% of the confirmed cases. For the other values of the latent,
infective, and disease periods, we obtain similar accuracy, given
by χ2 and similar scaling factors (Supplementary Table 1). The
scaling factor, which gives the fraction of the model estimates,
that corresponds to the confirmed case, increases to 10% in the
case of Tlat = 5, Tinf = 1, which is the case with less infected
individuals in the model.
The introduction of a single imported infected case after the
first wave has expired produces a secondary wave that strongly
depends on the first one (Figure 3). The intensity and duration
of the second wave depend on specific values capturing the
conditions applicable when newly infected cases appear, e.g.,
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FIGURE 2 | Active and cumulative infected time series in the Balearic Islands.
Time evolution of the average number of (A) active infected cases (black line)
and (B) cumulative number of cases with the best-fitted parameters, and
confidence interval CI 95% (gray area). Confidence intervals calculated using
Cox’s method (26). Red dots represent the data provided by the Ministry of
Health of Spain, the solid lines depict the model with the fitted parameters T lat
= 2, T inf = 4, Tdis = 12, β1 = 0.24, β2 = 0.12, β3 = 0.016, β4 = 0.036, β5 =
0, the orange area represents the number of undetected cases when
comparing model results with the data on detected cases.
the transmission probability, which depends on the habits of
the population, hygiene, and social distancing, and mobility
restriction. Qualitatively similar results were obtained for the
other set of values of the characteristic periods. The peak of the
second wave is very sensitive to the date of the first exposure. If
it happened on January 28th, the intensity of the second peak
is less pronounced and similar to the one for the first peak,
in contrast to the case of a more recent exposure, when the
second peak can be more than one order of magnitude larger
the first peak.
Effect of Quarantines on the Second Wave
We show the results of applying different levels of the stochastic
quarantine mechanism in Figure 3. The greater the percentage of
quarantined cases, the smaller is the peak of the second wave, and
the longer is it in duration. We also observe that, depending on
the fraction of cases that occurred during the first wave, the effect
of quarantining varies. So for the case when the first infection
occurred on Feb 7th (Figure 3A), the fraction of quarantined
cases that we need to reduce the peak of the second wave by
one order of magnitude is around 60%, while for a stronger first
wave (Figure 3B) the reduction of one order of magnitude of the
second wave is obtained with 40% quarantine.
FIGURE 3 | Secondary outbreak appearing after the home-based confinement
is removed. The lockdown is removed and the parameter values are as during
the week of March 16th−22nd. We simulated different degrees of quarantines
to explore its effect on the second wave. The greater the percentage of
infected cases that are quarantined at symptom onset, the smaller the
incidence of the second wave. The shaded area represents the 95% CI (for
clarity, only shown for the case of no quarantine). Confidence intervals
calculated using Cox’s method (26). (A) First infected case is on February 7th,
the number of infected in the first wave has not reached herd immunization
and a second wave is triggered by a single infected case. The intensity of the
second wave is one order of magnitude larger than the first. (B) First infected
case is on January 28th, the number of infected cases in the first wave has
reached a larger fraction of the population and the intensity of the second
wave is, in the scenario, smaller than the first. Average over 100 realizations.
Herd Immunization Estimates
Assuming recovered individuals get immunity, to estimate
whether the Balearic Islands have reached herd immunization,
we explored the estimated number of infected cases under
two immunization scenarios based on the date of the first
infection (Figure 4A) and the number of imported cases before
air and maritime transport lockdown (Figure 4B). Firstly, we
analyzed how the estimation of infected individuals is sensitive
to the date of the first infection. We explored the time range
of the first infection from January 28th (which corresponds
to the stay in France before returning to Majorca) to Feb
7th (which corresponds to 30 days before the 10th confirmed
case). Secondly, we explored the estimates under the assumption
that more than one imported case could have gone unnoticed
into the Balearic Islands before the closing of the airports.
Depending on these two parameters, the range of immunization
spans from 3% (for one initial infected on February 7th) to
64% (for 20 initial infected cases on January 28th). With the
assumption of immunity after recovery, the achievement of herd
immunization in the population is very sensitive to the date
of the first infection and the number of imported cases before
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FIGURE 4 | Fraction of infected individuals (in logarithmic scale) as a function
of the date of the first infection. (A) Each line corresponds to the following
parameter values(T lat, T inf )= (1,5) (black),(2,4) (red), (3,33) (orange), (4,2)
(magenta), and (5,1) (blue). (B) Fraction of infected cases as a function of the
first infection and the initial number of infected individuals. The radius of the
symbol is proportional to the fraction of infected cases while the color
indicates the probability that a realization of the model reaches at least 50% of
infected cases in the population, P50.
air and maritime transport lockdown. The interpretation of
herd immunization indicates that if infected individuals become
immune, then a percentage r of herd immunization prevents
the spreading of reproductive numbers smaller than 1/(1-r).
Assuming that the first case was exposed to the infection during
his stay in France in the last days of January, the percentage
of the population that was infected can be as high as 50%,
which could prevent a high second peak, for values of the
basic reproductive number below 2. Conversely, if the first case
was infected 30 days before 11 confirmed cases were reported
in the Balearic Islands, the percentage of infected individuals
could lower to <10%, therefore falling far from potential herd
immunity (only for values of the basic reproductive number
below 1.1). The relation between the number of initial infected
cases, the date of the first infection, the number of cases,
and the number of confirmed cases is further explored in the
Supplementary Materials.
CONCLUSIONS
Our study shows that a model including five compartments
together with information on mobility between municipalities
can be used to capture the spread of the epidemics in a closed
community. The validation of the model with the official data
allowed us to obtain the parameters that best fitted the data.
Once the model was validated, we extracted an estimation of the
number of the total infected in the Balearic Islands that indicates,
assuming immunization after recovery, that these figures would
reach the herd immunization threshold depending critically
on the date of the first infection and the initial number of
seeds, being herd immunization achievement more likely for an
initial date before January 31st and number of initial infected
above 10. Our exploration of the forecasted scenario of a newly
infected individual entering the community after the lockdown
confirmed that the number of potential cases widely varies
according to the initial date of infection, which correlates with
the percentages of immunity. Although we cannot determine
with precision the start of the infection in the Balearic Islands,
the model suggests that the Balearic Islands population is below
the herd immunization threshold and thus, also susceptible to
new outbreaks depending on how immunity is acquired and how
the mobility restrictions are further implemented. In particular
mobility and transmission probability, which depends on the
general use of masks and hygiene protocols by the population,
might alter the attack rate.
Focusing on second waves in insulated areas during the
COVID-19 pandemic is of great value to analyze the spreading
and containment of infectious diseases, where the lockdown of
islands constitutes a paradigmatic scenario, with the potential to
be applied to continental regions (13). For example, the risk of
COVID-19 import to the Pacific Islands had been assessed and
analyzed in the early stages (27–29). The use of modeling tools
is a complement to field studies that can be used to anticipate
the progress of a pandemic and thus help health authorities to
make decisions. In the case of the Balearic Islands, there are two
foremost advantages in terms of model precision. First, since the
incidence during the first peak was relatively low and hospital
capacity including ICU beds was not overpassed, the forecasted
scenario of a second wave presenting with more intensity is
more feasible than in other areas. Second, the relatively small
size of the Balearic Islands and the organization of health and
epidemiological surveillance systems make the official accounts
of reported cases more reliable than in other areas were due to
low rates of testing, overloaded hospitals, and lack of centralized
data collection hampered the initial estimates.
The implications of the forecasted potential second wave
yielded by our model for an insular territory can be useful also
for other areas that are either naturally geographically isolated
or closed to external perturbations due to strict lockdowns.
According to our results, the date of the first infection and the
import of cases while the airports and ports were open appear
to be key to assess the likelihood and intensity of future waves
and outbreaks. Knowing the approximate date of infection of
the first reported case in an outbreak proved critical to estimate
the current and foreseen number of cases. Whether a second
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wave occurs and the intensity of the peak strongly depended on
the date of the first infection, as the number of infected cases
grows exponentially, but also on the number of imported cases,
which contribute additively to the number of cases, and also on
the real herd immunization. Our estimates rely on calculations
assuming conditions far from the behavior of the population, and
on the habits, for example, regarding hygiene, the use of masks,
and social distancing, of the population after the lockdown is
relaxed.We further show that the effect of quarantiningmeasures
strongly depends on the level of immunization reached by the
population during the first wave.
Our model is an individual-based model for which, due to the
population size, we identify each inhabitant with an individual
in the simulation model. This approach is different from
other models considering pan-mixing and ordinary differential
equations (8), and forecasts based on iteration methods (24,
30). Other approaches implement recurrent mobility (3, 31,
32), which selects the individuals that perform the commuting
randomly at each iteration step, thus increasing the mixing in
the complete population. Our approach assigns a residence and
a working municipality as initial condition and these locations
remain unchanged during the time evolution for the model.
Our implementation assumes that the same person commutes
between two locations and thus it has to be fixed initially in
the model. A random selection at each day will increase the
number of effective connections, which could be compensated
by a reduction in the transmission probability. We believe
this approach is more comprehensive and better captures the
reality of commuting under home confinement conditions,
which essentially limit mobility from households to workplaces
for those individuals that cannot work remotely or are not
exempted from any work under the regulations of each country,
while the rest of the population are not supposed to move
from the vicinity of their households and even then only for
justified reasons such as basic food supply. We use here a
stochastic approach similar to other works (22, 33) which lets
us compute confidence intervals even for single combinations
of the parameters instead of deterministic ordinary differential
equations (8, 34, 35) or discrete-time dynamic equations (3).
We also use a fixed time for the transit through the E, I, and
D compartments, Tlat, Tinf, and Tdis, respectively. We believe
this approach is more realistic than an approach based on rates,
where individuals transit the compartments at a given rate,
giving rise to exponentially distributed times of transit through
the compartments. In this case, infected cases will have the
opportunity to be infectious immediately, or to transit the I
compartment also immediately, bringing the start of secondary
infections closer to the time they were infected for many
individuals. A similar effect happens with the length of the disease
(time in the D compartment), having then individuals that
immediately recover.
The model also has several limitations. First, as it is
constructed for fitting the global numbers of infected patients,
it is missing finer structure, needed for the evaluation of risks
of subpopulations that are differently exposed to the virus or
have different outcomes, such as the population of elderly people
or health workers, and the effect of city size (36, 37). Second,
for COVID-19 there is evidence of three main transmission
channels, namely direct contact with an infected individual with
symptoms (14), contacts with an asymptomatic individual (38,
39), and environmental transmission (40). The present model
takes into account the first two modes of transmission, but
not the environmental one explicitly, although probably the
fitting has assigned part of this transmission to the processes
included in our model. Therefore, there is not a direct way of
measuring the effect of interventions to reduce environmental
transmission. Third, the model also considers asymptomatic
and symptomatic individuals to be infectious in the same way,
although the viral shedding in asymptomatic individuals is
indeed lower (5). This can have an impact on the number
of infected individuals and deserves future research. Fourth,
the model assumes that the mobility restrictions are applied
in the same way to all of the agents in the system and thus
is lacking the fact that symptomatic infected individuals will
modify their mobility drastically, either if they are quarantined at
home or admitted to a hospital. We are therefore overestimating
mobility, but this is probably passed to the infectivity in the
fitting procedure. Fifth, the model also takes fixed times to transit
through the E, I, and D compartments (Tlat, Tinf, and Tdis,
respectively), which is artificial. More refined models would take
these transit times from specified distributions matching the
parameters of the disease (33, 35). While this will render the
model more realistic, we believe that fixing the times is a good
compromise between using rates for transiting the compartments
and implementing distributions for those times, as it already
captures the delays induced by these particular timings of
the infection. Finally, the model also assumes that individuals
are granted immunity to the virus, at least for the timescales
explored here.
In conclusion, the risk of secondary infection waves should
be comprehensively and cautiously addressed before removing
confinement measures. Our study provides several relevant
findings that could be useful to support policy design at
avoiding second waves once measures to return to the societal
usual activities start to be applied. First, the isolation of
asymptomatic individuals that tested positive for SARS-CoV-2
and close contacts to infected individuals during the prior 2
weeks might reduce the number of new infections after the
establishment of the usual activity by preventing dissemination
from asymptomatic carriers during the incubation period.
This requires proper testing strategies tailored according to
the estimated prevalence of infection, population density, the
openness of the community, and other relevant factors. Second,
contact tracing measures are crucial, and digital tools might
enhance the identification of high-risk individuals to be tested
or preemptively isolated (41). Yet, data privacy and other
relevant ethical considerations should be carefully balanced
when designing contact tracing in the community. Third,
progressive return to the normal activity instead of an abrupt
change will facilitate the monitoring of new cases and may
avoid a sharp growth of the number of infected individuals,
which is expected when herd immunity has not been reached.
Experience from other archipelagos illustrates the potential of
pursuing an elimination strategy (including a full lockdown)
Frontiers in Medicine | www.frontiersin.org 7 December 2020 | Volume 7 | Article 563455
Eguíluz et al. Risk of Secondary Infection Waves
together with quarantine of travelers from abroad (42, 43).
Further modeling studies on second-waves of COVID-19 are
warranted to strengthen the knowledge on the best theoretical
assumptions and data to be used to increase forecasting
precision. In addition, these models should be validated
through real-world data as these are collected during and
after the pandemic.
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